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ABSTRACT
“Were the Court to leave the world, the world would continue
without our participation,” 1 writes Justice Breyer to explain that global
constitutionalism will survive regardless of the more or less isolationist
role that the US Supreme Court chooses for itself. In an era of
increasing relevance of international treaties, Breyer explains, the
Supreme Court has acquired a deeper knowledge of other legal systems
and its judges welcome exchanges with foreign judges, bar associations
and students. 2 The parallel with the US context is that even if the
United Kingdom leaves the EU and “Brexit means Brexit,” in its harder
or softer version, its domestic courts will not become secluded nor
change their judicial style as soon as a new Treaty between the UK and
the EU is concluded. Similarly, the transnational judicial style of the
Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) interpreting European law is
unlikely to change because of Brexit. The influences of EU law on UK
law and vice-versa will endure. If French remains the working language
of the Court of Justice, there is no doubt among lawyers and judges that
English will remain the most common spoken language for working at
or with the Court. So even if the Luxembourg judicial style will not
change much more than it already did in incorporating a common law
jurisdiction in its predominantly continental legal style, the biggest
consequence of Brexit is the end of flux of preliminary references
coming from the UK lower courts to Luxembourg. 3 Since 1973 the
judicial dialogue between UK courts and Luxembourg has transformed
the judicial hierarchy and the legal practice of domestic courts.
Terminating the “direct” jurisdiction4 of the CJEU on UK courts, as
Prime Minister Theresa May has forcibly demanded, will not end the
more indirect influence of EU law on UK courts and its lawyers.

1. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 245 (2015).
2. Id. at ch. 11.
3. See Takis Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and
Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, 40 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 9, 36
(2003).
4. See Britain cannot escape the long arm of European Law, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 26,
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21727039-though-government-may-pretendotherwise-european-court-justice-will-have-role-after.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While being initially sui generis, the judicial style of the European
Court of Justice (“CJEU”) has become increasingly relevant within and
beyond EU borders as a transnational adjudication model for global
constitutionalism. 5 Since the adoption of the Nice Charter of
Fundamental Rights, bound to mark the beginning of a new European
era, scholars have appraised the Luxembourg style for its low judicial
transparency due to its per curiam deliberations compared to other
transnational courts. 6 For instance in defying the practice of citing
foreign judgments the CJEU appeared timid vis à vis the rest of the
world, especially when compared to its regional counterpart, the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.7
In the aftermath of the many European crises, however, the
Luxembourg judicial style has become more visible due to a number of
different factors including the expansion of EU competences on which
the CJEU should give its uniform interpretation, the reduction of its
enormous docket due to its efficient distribution of workload among its
two courts, and its less formalist yet eclectic legal reasoning coupled
by a less convoluted but still minimalist style. For instance, the Court’s
jurisprudence interpreting human rights regimes and international trade
agreements have important global implications beyond EU borders. In
addition, its judicial dialogue with national courts and their resistance
to Luxembourg’s primacy have become part of a unique European legal
space. 8 In short, all eyes are on Luxembourg and its dialogue with
domestic, constitutional and international courts.9
Since its accession to the European Economic Community in
1973, UK judges, lawyers and legal scholars over time have
5. Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 397, 397-98 (2009) (“Global constitutionalism is an academic and political agenda that
identifies and advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in the international
legal sphere in order to improve the effectiveness and the fairness of the international legal
order.”).
6. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2017) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955172).
7 . See Christopher McCrudden, Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights
Adjudication: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human
Rights Compared, 15 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2013).
8 . See ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE
REFORMED CONCEPT AND ITS QUEST FOR COMPARISON (Max Planck Institute for Comparative
Public Law & International Law, 2016).
9. See Koen Lenaerts, La Vie Après L’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not
Blind) Trust, 54 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 805, 805–840 (2017).
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contributed through its common law traditions to influence the legal
reasoning and the judicial style of the CJEU. By the same token, UK
legal elites and, in particular, judges have continued to adapt or resist
the Luxembourg judicial style back home. Several scholars have
explained how UK courts had to adapt to the Community legal order
with its new judicial architecture and legal reasoning without knowing
how they would become an integral part of it. 10 While judicial
adaptation happened through the inclusion of doctrines such as
proportionality and legitimate expectation, for instance, in UK
administrative law, 11 some judges remained faithful to a more
formalist interpretation of statutes more in tune with the parliamentary
sovereignty tradition as a way to resist the primacy of EU law and
maintain the British tradition challenge by the “incoming tide” of the
EU Treaty.
The central legal fiction in the post-accession legal order was that
Community law was only directly applicable in national law through
the European Communities Act adopted by the UK Parliament in 1972.
This fiction allowed maintaining the centrality of parliamentary
sovereignty while taming the fear of a necessary erosion of sovereignty
expressed especially by politicians in the Labor Party. 12 Without
departing from the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, UK courts
were now asked to review and possibly set aside the Westminster’s
laws when incompatible with Community law. In doing so, national
judges were given broad discretion to interpret or refer to Luxembourg
domestic laws. 13 Not all UK judges were able to exercise such
discretion and instead they expressed their resistance to primacy of EU
law by setting aside incompatible national law recognizing, but at the
same time, reinstating, the hierarchy of parliamentary sovereignty in
the UK legal order. 14
With the UK exodus from the EU, there is some questioning
among lawyers about whether the Luxembourg style will continue and
10. See John Bridge, National Legal Tradition and the Common Law: Legislative Drafting
and Juridical Interpretation in England and the European Community, 19 J. OF COMMON MKT.
STUD. 351, 353 (1981).
11. See Jonathan E. Levitsky, The Europeanization of the British Legal Style, 42 AM. J.
OF COMPARATIVE L. 347, 375 (1994).
12. See Labor and Common Market, Report on the Exchange with UK Lawyers in 1962
at 51 (on file with author).
13. See Simmenthal S.P.A. v. Amministrazione Delle Finanze pello Stato, Case 106/77,
1978 E.C.R. I-0629.
14. Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, 195 EWHC Admin (2002), ¶ 67.
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the English will remain a language of wide use, together with French,
among judges, référendaires and lawyers linguists as well as those
solicitors and barristers litigating the many riddles of EU law in
Luxembourg. However, little attention has been given to how the repeal
of the European Communities Act by the Great Repeal Bill impacts
domestic courts and their institutional functions.15 In the aftermath of
the Miller judgment, EU law as held by the Supreme Court “through
the conduit pipe” 16 of the European Communities Act, remains an
integral part of the UK legal system from which domestic courts might
find it hard to disentangle. The more interesting question would be how
post-Brexit the national court will treat the CJEU case law ranging from
precedent, persuasive or no authority whatsoever. 17 The harder
question though is whether once precluded from making preliminary
references and setting aside national law, British courts will return
quietly to their pre-accession style rather than exercising the extensive
power of judicial review on legislative and executive acts they enjoyed
in the EU judicial space. As some have noticed, however, the Human
Rights Act 1998 may well also empower the courts in a similar way,
though here all the courts can do is declare national law incompatible
with the HRA 98 and not display it as in EU Law.18
This contribution will proceed by first showing the relevance of
the Luxembourg judicial style in global constitutionalism. The UK
influence through its judges, advocate generals and lawyers
participating to the process of “Europeanization of domestic law” has
changed and added common law features to the CJEU style. Then I will
address in four Acts the Brexit drama in the complex interplay between
Community and UK law. Even though the drama over Brexit has been

15. Thomas Horsley, Brexit and UK Courts: Awaiting Fresh Instruction, in THE UK
74 (Michael Dougan ed.)(July 2017).
16. Jeffery Miller, A View from the Trenches: Lessons from Coleman v. Attridge Law
(May 9, 2017) (unpublished dissertation, European University Institute) (on file with author).
17. See The Government’s Negotiating Objectives, House of Commons White Paper, HC
1125, at ¶ 30 (4 April 2017) https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/
cmexeu/1125/1125.pdf (“Once the European Communities Act 1972 is repealed, UK courts will
no longer be bound by decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). . . .
[h]owever, the extent to which UK courts continue to take account of CJEU case law remains to
be decided.”).
18 . See generally RICHARD GORDON QC AND ROWENA MOFFATT, BREXIT: THE
IMMEDIATE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 30-31 (2016). Gratitude and credit to Giorgio Monti
for this contribution.
AFTER BREXIT LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES
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described in either six or three acts by prominent EU Law academics,19
the focus on the Luxembourg judicial style and the “legal irritation”20
of the UK legal profession having to adjust to EU law and the
interpretation of the Court of Justice has not been central to this debate.
This is evident from the documents of the Commission’s Legal Service
many showing that lawyers and the Commission’s civil servants had,
since 1962, found several elements for legal irritation in the clash
between different methods of statutory interpretation and in the new
judicial architecture that through the preliminary ruling allowed UK
court to refer cases directly to the Court of Justice. This created a
dangerous liaison outside the scope of the darling parliamentary
sovereignty tradition in the United Kingdom.
In Act I this article shows the concerns lawyers and the
Commission had on reconciling the UK with the Community legal
system since the early 1960s. In relying on archival materials from both
the Commission’s legal services files as well as in the Prime Minister
Harold Wilson’s speeches it becomes clear that the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty plays a central role to the UK accession to
the EEC. Act II shows how the acceptance of and resistance to
European law happened among British high Court judges in the 1970s.
Act III explains how later in time the preliminary reference to
Luxembourg allowed domestic courts to maintain their a textualist
interpretation of the CJEU decisions and repeal UK law without
departing from parliamentary democracy. In Act IV the Miller
judgment by the Supreme Court reappraises how parliamentary
supremacy was reconciled with the primacy of EU law in a UK dualist
legal system without really focusing on oddity of the existence of a
preliminary ruling mechanism. In conclusion, after this four act drama,
the Luxembourg judicial style might not change much yet Brexit will
create more turmoil within UK courts. These will have the hard task to
operationalize the international Treaty that will be in place within the
short timeframe of Art. 50 TEU but this time without the possibility of
referring questions on its interpretation to Luxembourg.

19. See Paul Craig, Brexit – A Drama in Six Acts 41 EL REV. 447 (2016); Tamara Ćapeta,
Brexit and the EU constitutional order: a Three Act Tragedy 42 Croatian Yearbook of European
Law and Policy 1 (2016).
20. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying
Law Ends Up in New Differences, 61 MODERN LAW REVIEW 11, 11-32 (1998).
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II. GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LUXEMBOURG
JUDICIAL STYLE: FROM OUTDATED TO DIPLOMATIC?
The constitutional debate on the use of foreign law and practice in
domestic courts remains a hotly contested issue, especially so in a
Trump-Brexit era when the reaffirmation of national sovereignty
through the rise of extremist values and political and economic
introspection are in the ascendency. Famously, just over a decade ago,
Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia debated the use of foreign
law by the Supreme Court of the United States,21 with Scalia’s more
insular approach seemingly winning the day, despite the opposing
preferences of other Justices, such as Breyer, Ginsburg 22 and
Kennedy. 23 Since then, Justice Breyer has restated the case for the
judge to also be a “diplomat” and to learn from foreign legal ideas, for
instance the European constitutional concept of proportionality when
adjudicating on the First Amendment.24
The CJEU has resisted to the use of foreign legal citations when
these do not arise from the common legal traditions of its 28 Member
states and with the increasing relevance of the cross citation of the
ECtHR jurisprudence that creates a sort of cross-pollination. 25 Given
nature of its transactional jurisdiction vis-à-vis twenty-eight EU
member states the foreign influence remains relevant to the Court but
in a rather indirect manner. 26 For instance no direct citation to the
United States Supreme Court appears from the judgments of the CJEU
even though the opinions of its advocates general sparsely cite the U.S.
jurisprudence.27 This is in sharp contrast from its regional counterpart,
the European Court of Human Rights based in Strasbourg that openly
cites in its decisions the judgments of other constitutional and
21. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases: A Conversation Between Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 519-531 (October 1, 2005).
22. Lyle Denniston, Ginsburg on Kagan and Foreign Law, SCOTUS BLOG (July 30th,
2010l, 6:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/07/ginsburg-on-kagan-and-foreign-law/.
23. Roper v. Simmons 125 U.S. 1183 (2005) (plurality opinion)
24. Breyer, supra note 1, at ch.15.
25. See McCrudden, supra note 7; Siniša Rodin, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign
Court Decisions, 64 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 815, 815-840 (2016); GÁBOR HALMAI, THE USE
OF FOREIGN LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1328-48 (M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajó
eds., 2012).
26. See Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, The Comparative Law Method And The
European Court Of Justice: Echoes Across The Atlantic, 64 AM. J. OF COMPARATIVE L. 841
(2016).
27. Refer to AG Saggio and AG Jacobs.

1512 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:5

international courts.28 Due to the self-restraint of the CJEU, looking
into citations might not be the best way to assess the influences coming
from foreign courts and vice-versa. Rather, as suggested by Justice
Breyer, there are ways to encourage judicial diplomacy by exchanging
views that will influence the legal reasoning of the judges in
understanding how the CJEU has used the doctrine of proportionality
to enhance precision and transparency in their judgments29 and created
the primacy of EU law on domestic law even though national courts
retain their final word on it.30
Scholars of global constitutionalism have assessed how
constitutional law making is increasingly relevant in an international
context and in particular through the lenses of transnational dialogue
among domestic and supranational courts, 31 through the concept of
migration of constitutional ideas, 32 and the notion that judicial
comparativism can be a form of judicial diplomacy. 33 Scholars of
global constitutionalism seek to highlight how courts are in permanent
dialogue with foreign judges, international members of the bar and
even students of law so that some of these exchanges of ideas might
end up influencing the constant evolution of judicial lawmaking.34
In this context, the CJEU’s opaque and meticulous judicial style
has been criticized by commentators for its lack of transparency and
consistency, characterized by the secrecy of its deliberations and
informal procedures.35 In the 1960s, the judicial style of the Court was
clearly embedded in different civil law traditions, as its German,
28. See Oliari and Others v. Italy, App. No. 18766/11, 36030/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 4 (2015).
29. Breyer, supra note 1, at 262.
30. Id. at 245.
31. See Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L. J. 487 (2005) (cited
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurring opinion in Kansas v. Marsh,
126 S.Ct. 2516 (2006)).
32. SUJIT CHOUDHRY, THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (2008).
33. David Law, Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163 U. PENN. L. REV.
927 (2015).
34 . RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Ch. 4-6 (2014); but see, Armin von Bogdandy, Comparative
Constitutional Law As a Social Science? A Hegelian Reaction to Ran Hirschl’s Comparative
Matters, MAX PLANCK INST. COMP. PUB. L. & INT’L L. (2016).
35 . See Alberto Alemanno & Oana Stefan, Openness at the Court of Justice of the
European Union: Toppling a Taboo, 51 COMMON MKT L. REV. 97 (2014); Angela Huyue
Zhang, The Faceless Court, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 71 (2016); J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Judging
the Judges – Apology and Critique, in JUDGING EUROPE’S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 235 (Maurice Adams et. al., eds., 2013).
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French, Italian, and Benelux judges’ Romano-Germanic traditions
were the predominant legal culture among judges. In the best civil law
tradition, judges should have been mere interpreters of the EEC Treaty
and write their judgments in a succinct and overly structured fashion.
By the same token, their succinct style, allowed them to exercise more
discretion in interpreting the gaps, conflict and ambiguities in the
Treaty than common law judges. In fact, when it came to follow or
overrule their precedents, without saying so, continental judges used
teleological interpretation subverting the classic international law
interpretative method.36
From 1973 onwards civil lawyers were no longer the prominent
legal tradition in the CJEU and the EEC accession of the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark brought significant new judicial styles
to Luxembourg. In particular, several authors highlighted how, initially
modeled on the French Conseil d’Etat, the Court shifted to more
eclectic style in interpretation ranging from the use of civilian general
principles to common law tools such as stare decisis and an
argumentative style driven by policy considerations. 37 As Justice
David Edwards explained the civil law tradition provided a strategic
tool to judge-made law requiring fewer justifications: “Perhaps the
Court has brought an apparently “civilian” approach to bear simply
because it is a sensible way to think about law, which neither
consciously nor unconsciously reflects the civilian upbringing of most
of the judges.”38 What is important to highlight, is that common law
discursive style, however, was more formalist than its civil law
counterpart with respect to statutory interpretation. In this realm UK
judges who were not interpreting the common law rules based on
precedents but rather Parliamentary acts, expressing the will of
Westminster, had much less discretion that its civilian counterparts to
depart from the literal or plain meaning of the statutes.

36. See Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratis der Belastingen, Case 26/62, 1963
E.C.R. I-2 (in which the ECJ subverts the order of Treaty interpretation starting from the goal
rather than the textual meaning of its words).
37. See Takis Tridimas, Precedent and the Court of Justice. A Jurisprudence of Doubt?,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 307, 308 (Julie Dickson et. al.
eds. 2012); MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 203 (2004).
38. See David Edward, The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the Work of
the European Court of Justice, in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW: ABERDEEN
QUINCENTENARY ESSAYS at 14 (D.L. Carey Miller et. al., eds. 1997).
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In Weiler and De Búrca’s edited volume, appraising the Court’s
new judicial architecture après Nice,39 the amount of scholarly work
focusing on the CJEU increased exponentially. There was then, and in
part continues nowadays, a common howling regarding the
Luxembourg judicial style that, despite its increasing prominence and
relevance in Europe, received relatively little scholarly attention
outside the EU or globally.40 Some scholars remain unhappy with the
lack of transparency in the Court’s decisions that takes away from its
clarity in judicial reasoning. This quest for transparency remains
unsatisfied for those who point at the lack of dissenting and concurring
opinions,41 and the non-explicit use of comparative legal sources on
which the Court relies.42
Thus, Luxembourg’s outmoded flair, mostly derived from the
continental “cryptic, Cartesian style” 43 should be abandoned,
according to Weiler, in favor of a “more discursive, analytic and
conversational style associated with the common law world.” 44 To
Weiler the civil law style does not serve the needs of constitutionalism
because: “[it] is not a basis of confidence-building European
constitutional relations between the European Court and its national
constitutional counterparts.” 45 On the one hand, this statement is a
premonition of the current primacy epics such as Gauweiler,46 Ajos47
and Taricco48 characterized by the resistance of national constitutional
courts. In all these cases constitutional law scholars have criticized the
cryptic style of the CJEU and its indifference to the legal national

39. Weiler, supra note 34.
40. See Daniela Caruso, European Union Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 TUL. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 175 (2011).
41. See V.F. Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L
L. 307 (2009); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: Causes and
Consequences (2015), https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/84 (unfinished draft
paper prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference,
Mar. 5–7, 2015).
42. Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice
as a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 168 (2013); McCrudden,
supra note 7.
43. Weiler, supra note 34.
44. Id. at 219.
45. Id.
46. Gauweiler and Others, Case C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400 [2015].
47. Dansk Industri v. Rasmussen, Case C-441/14, EU:C:2016:278 [2016].
48. Taricco and Others, Case C 105/14, EU:C:2015:555 [2015].
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traditions.49 On the other hand, Weiler’s statement is limited by its own
constitutional framework for which the Court is no longer an
international tribunal, but rather a constitutional actor at the center of
European legal evolution.50 In contrast to such a view, scholars have
characterized the CJEU as a constitutional as well as administrative
jurisdiction 51 through which the dialogue with a wide variety of
international courts and international organization characterizes the
global reach of EU law. 52
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum the Court has a slimmer
docket, a reformed architecture and it has shown new interpretative
guidance especially in the area of international investment with the
opinion of UK advocate general Eleanor Sharpston, 53 or the
interpretation of international free trade agreements potentially having
third party effects beyond the contracting parties. 54 Because of this
awareness of its global role, the minimalist Luxembourg judicial style
appears more functional to maintain the interplay between law and
diplomacy,55 thus serving a strategic purpose rather than reflecting a
civil law outlook. Caught by the Brexit dilemma of a UK that should
be at the same more inward looking but aspire to a global influence,
British courts will no longer be in direct dialogue with Luxembourg but
will continue to closely monitor the jurisprudence of the CJEU.
III. HOW THE LUXEMBOURG JUDICIAL STYLE HAS CHANGED
AFTER THE UK ACCESSION
With the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
in 1973, the predominance among civil law traditions was no longer
the status quo in Luxembourg with the entrance of common law and
Scandinavian legal systems in the Community. The influence of the
common law style began showing its effects in the CJEU’s more
49. GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE’S
LEGAL SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOUGE AND THE CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS 227
(2012) (citing Bin and Fabbrini)
50. See Weiler, supra note 34.
51 . PETER LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE
NATION-STATE (2010).
52. ELAINE FAHEY, THE GLOBAL REACH OF EU LAW (2016).
53. See Sharpston Opinon 2/15 on Singapore- EU Free Trade Agreement
54. See Council v. Front Polisario, Case C-104/16P, 2016 E.C.R. 677.
55. See Mikael Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The
European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and
Politics, 32(1) LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 137-159 (2007).
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careful analysis of its own precedents, which by the 1980s, were also
of greater number.56 In asserting the influence of precedent in famous
cases such as “Buy Irish”57 and through expressions such as “as the
Court repeatedly held,”58 the use of the common law tradition was also
a strategy to assert the legitimacy and coherence of the Court’s
jurisprudence, showing to a newcomer (the Republic of Ireland in that
case) that even advertising measures promoted by a private body could
fall under the restrictions of Article 34 TFEU.
The UK legal system through its barristers, advocate generals,
judges and civil servants now into the Community institutions managed
to influence the Luxembourg’s procedure. For instance, UK lawyers
were advocating in favor of expanding the rights of parties, such as in
the infringement procedure that the Commission can bring before the
Court against the member states under Article 258 TFEU. Throughout
the Commission’s proceedings, states are considered litigants with
procedural rights of notification and information rather than “a sinner
who ought to repent.” 59 As a result, the Court held that when the
Commission fails to fulfill an essential procedural requirement, such
defect will taint the judgment in favor of the state.60
The UK style in Luxembourg became more prominent through the
opinions of its advocate generals, such as the half-French Jean-Pierre
Warner (1973-81) then Francis G. Jacobs (1988-2006) replaced by
Eleanor Sharpston (2007-present), the first UK woman to take this
position. It is worth noticing that historic UK judges such as Alexander
Mackenzie Stuart (1973-1988) and David Edwards (1992-2004) were
both Scottish; not by chance the government had named Scottish judges
coming from a hybrid legal system resenting both civil and common
law influences.
For instance, the role of A.G. Jacobs was central with respect to
the protection of individuals through an effective judicial review that
ensures the observance of the rule of law the CJEU did not fully change
56. See Tridimas, supra note 37.
57. See Case 249/81, Comm’n v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005.
58. See Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal
Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 504 (1991)(citing Case 113/80, Comm’n v. Ireland, 1981
E.C.R. 1625, 1639).
59. See Tim Koopmans, The Court of Justice and National Legal Traditions, in LA COUR
DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES 1952–2002: BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES; ACTES
DE LA CONFÉRENCE ORGANISÉE DANS LE CADRE DU CINQUANTIE ME ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA

COUR DE JUSTICE 15, 22 (2004).
60. See Comm’n v. Germany, Case C-431/92, 1995 E.C.R. I-2189, ¶ 45.
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this aspect of its jurisprudence.61 The tension, however, arose around
the narrow avenue in judicial review for individuals to challenge
general measures became clear with the 1998 Greenpeace case, in
which the environmental organization was denied standing, and led to
the subsequent opinion delivered by advocate general Francis Jacobs
in the UPA case,62 now a classic among EU lawyers,63 advocating a
flexible approach in the interpretation of the test for standing, without
departing from the notion that individual concern would fully protect
individual rights.64
Despite a short-lived victory when the opinion was adhered to by
the General Court, the Court of Justice ultimately rejected advocate
general Jacobs’s expansive interpretation.65 As a result, when there is
no remedy for private individuals, the Court “puts the onus on the
national courts to do all they can to create one.”66 Jacobs also noted that
his opinion stirred a vigorous debate, not only among academics, but
also in relation to the new drafting of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet the new
formulation of Article 263(4) TFEU did not create a smoother avenue
for individual applicants. Rather, because of a slip in the wording of
the Lisbon Treaty, it required further judicial interpretation, ultimately
causing the CJEU to hold that judicial review of “regulatory acts” is
nearly precluded for private applicants.67
Under the influence of UK lawyers and judges in favor of having
more of an adversarial and oral character to the litigation in
Luxembourg,68 the CJEU reformed its oral procedure, allowing judges
61. See Angela Ward & Locus Standi, Under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty: Crafting a
Coherent Test for a Wobbly Polity, 22 Y.B. EUR. L. 45 (2003).
62. See Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, 2002 E.C.R. I-06677,
¶¶ 59–72.
63. See Catherine Barnard, Studying EU Law: A Law Student’s Guide, EU LAW ANALYSIS
(Oct. 2016), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/p/studying-eu-law-catherine-barnard.html
64. See Rosa Greaves, Commentary on Selected Opinions of Advocate General Jacobs, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 690, 712–14 (2006).
65. See Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, Case C-50/00 P, ¶¶ 41–45 (deferring to member
states the creation of a system of legal remedies and procedures that ensure the right to effective
judicial protection).
66. See Francis G. Jacob, Effective Judicial Protection of Individuals in the European
Union, Now and in the Future, in THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND 335 (Mads Andenas &
John Usher eds., 2003).
67. See Roberto Mastroianni & Andrea Pezza, Access of Individuals to the European
Court of Justice of the European Union Under the New Text of Article 263, ¶ 4, TFEU, 5
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 923 (2014).
68 . R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).
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to entertain possible hearings of submissions from interested parties
and, if appropriate, from the advocate general.69 This change was not
favored by all judges or advocate generals coming from a legal tradition
in which oral hearings are not crucial to their deliberation and might
only lengthen the time of the procedure in Luxembourg.70
In exceptional cases, the Court could even reopen a case for oral
arguments if it had a sense that a decision could not be made without a
full discussion of the issues at stake. 71 Such oral hearings are not
always a pleasant experience for civil law judges, advocate generals
and lawyers in Luxembourg; at times, they lengthened the procedure
or augmented confusion, instead of providing clarity to the case. 72
However, the oral procedure shaped the legal culture in a way that
enabled Luxembourg to coagulate its dialogue with the bar and to
require that lawyers be prepared to engage judges in discussion.
Some advocate generals, not surprising the UK ones, take more
advantage of this oral discussion than other, to better understand the
factual circumstances of each case and their distributive consequences.
For instance I have argued elsewhere that A.G. Sharpton’s common
law background made her more sensitive to these types of
considerations especially when EU law could impact the powers and
resources of differently situated groups.73
IV. ACT I: THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE CHALLENGE
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The fact that the UK would join the European Economic
Community (ECC) was already raising some concerns in the Brussels
circles in the early 1960s. The UK applied twice to become a member
of the EEC and both applications in 1961 and 1967 under Prime
Minister Harold Wilson were vetoed by French President Charles de
Gaulle worried that UK membership could weaken the community and
69. See Transocean Marine Paint Ass’n v. Comm’n, Case 17/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1063 (the
first case in which the Court of Justice recognized the right to an oral hearing).
70. See Matilde Cohen, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Deliberations: Two Models of Judicial
Deliberations in Courts of Last Resort, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 951 (2014).
71. See Comm’n v. United Kingdom, Case 170/78, 1980 E.C.R. 417; Koopmans, supra
note 58, at 503 (citing the opinion of Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat).
72. See Koopmans, supra note 58, at 505.
73. See Fernanda Nicola, Conceptions of Justice from Below: Distributive Justice as a
Means to Address Local Conflicts in European Law and Policy (American University, WCL
Research Paper No. 2014-42, August 19, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2483032 (referencing
AG Sharpston’s opinion in Belgium Insurance Scheme).
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enhance the influence of the United States on Europe. Finally in 1973
the conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath took the UK into the
Community with the strong support of the Confederation of British that
published several industrial appraisals showing how the benefits to join
the community outweighed the costs. When the opposition Labor
leadership came back into power with the mild socialism of Harold
Wilson, he launched a referendum that confirmed with over 65% in
1975 the continued membership of the UK to the Community.74
Another concern was the fact that the UK was after WWII a
reluctant European country, 75 and even more worrisome was the
different legal culture. This was based on two central premises: on the
one principle of parliamentary sovereignty entailing the constant
although formalist dialogue between courts and parliament and the
other was the common law style foreign among the six founding
members of the ECC. In particular, the common law style entailed both
stylistic and legal reasoning differences in judicial law making
including the binding use of precedents, stare decisis, the wide-use of
facts, an open engagement with policy considerations and the textual
interpretation of statutes avoiding manufactured interpretations by
judges based on the legislative history of the statutes. In the absence of
a constitution, English judges were striving to a “work-fidelity” in the
interpretation of statutes, keen to look at facts to induce their legal
reasoning while constrained by their own legal precedents. 76 The
common law remained highly formulaic and, despite its medieval writ
system has been eliminated this model left in place procedural
restraints and guarantees through which the presentation of legal claims
or legal defenses became central to protect individual rights.77
Once the Crown had ratified the treaty of accession it was clear
among lawyers in the Commission, the Assembly and in the UK that
Community law could become English law treated as such by English
courts only with an Act of Parliament due to the limited powers of the
Crown to sign the Treaty of Rome in the dualist UK legal system. In an
explanatory memorandum the Commission explained how without the
74. PHILIP ZIEGLER, WILSON: THE AUTHORIZED LIFE (1993).
75. DAVID GOWLAND AND ARTHUR TURNER, RELUCTANT EUROPEANS: BRITAIN AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1945-1998 (2014).
76. See McCrudden, supra note 7, at 64.
77. See Michele Graziadei, Rights in the European Landscape: A Historical and
Comparative Profile, in The Coherence of EU Law 63, 87 (Sacha Prechal & Bert van Roermund
eds., 2008).
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Act of Parliament there was a twofold problem: some of the Treaty
articles would not have had self-executing effect, national courts could
have not referred preliminary references to Luxembourg based on
Article 177 and regulations would have had to be implemented by an
Act of Parliament thus foregoing the annulment proceeding before
European institutions in Luxembourg. 78 Even though the Act of
Parliament could [insert] some of the legal implications of the UK
accession the central principle that remained a problem was the notion
of parliamentary sovereignty.
This notion implied that without a constitution Parliament is
completely “unfettered and free to make or unmake any law it wishes.”
Such doctrine lead to two distinct and interrelated problems for
Community law, first was the fact that if parliamentary sovereignty
could not bind its successors there was no statute of such nature that
could not be repealed later by a simple Act of Parliament. Second,
courts were bound to give effect to Parliamentary sovereignty so that
any subsequent act of parliament contrary to previous inconsistent
legislation meant an implied repeal of the earlier statute.79
In practice, however, the British legal system provided some
escamotages especially with respect to international Treaty obligations
for which a parliamentary convention provided that “the Parliament
must not pass legislation which is inconsistent with the treaty
obligations of the United Kingdom” otherwise such Act would be
illegal and even if adopted, would have to be enforced by domestic
courts. Paradoxically, in order to respect the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, a praxis rather than a statute, created a presumption that
Courts were bound to the textual interpretation even of an illegal
statute.80
Since 1962 the Legal Service of the Commission had organized
different meeting to have the opportunity of discussing with British
lawyers about some of the fundamental problems they envisaged in the
EEC accession. At the center of their concerns there was the same need
to reconcile parliamentary sovereignty and the need of an enabling
legislation by the Parliament of the Treaties and Community regulation
to make these self-executing. Yet even more pressing was the question
78. See Memorandum from M. Mathew, Rapporteur for the Commission des Affaires
Generales, Assembly of the Western European Union (1962), at 3-4.
79. Id. at 4.
80. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
292 (1915) (commenting on the power of conventions on UK constitutional law).
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of judicial hierarchy in the UK and the new role to be played by the
Court of Justice vis à vis English courts:
In General the British lawyers were anxious to ascertain to what
extent the judicial remedies available and the procedure before the
Court of Justice differ from the practice and standards of the
English judicial system. In particular the British lawyers assessed
the vital importance of a uniform interpretation of the Community
law by the Court of Justice, as provided by the EEC Treaty Art
177.81

Due to these concerns, the Commission was eager to mobilize the
UK bar and in a second report in June 1962 the Legal Services had a
meeting at the Europa Institute at Leyden, this time also with members
of the bench, practicing lawyers and academics. Similar problems
were raised at this second meeting with respect how to reconcile the
UK rule of recognition of parliamentary supremacy and also how to
maintain the traditional judicial hierarchy of their legal system:
British lawyers were particularly anxious to clarify the meaning of
the court of law instance as provided for by Article 177, paragraph
3. […] Generally the British lawyers seemed to favor in one way
or another the view that for all practical purposes the Court of
Appeal should be considered as the Court of last instance.82

The breakthrough, however, was that not only problems but
possible solutions were presented on how to reconcile the English legal
system with Community law. Even though the Parliament would adopt
a law transposing the Rome Treaty several conflicts were bound to arise
between Community and UK law that will be solved either by the
legislatures or by the court. Bound by the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy the majority of British lawyers anticipated having the
legislature, rather than the courts through litigation, resolve the
possible conflicts. The solution presented was that the Parliament
would draft additional legislation “clearing up such conflicts” 83
between the Treaties and UK law, and in case of future regulation this
could be timely informed by the government so “it could prepare the
necessary modification to the English law.”84
81. Legal Service of the European Commission, First Report on the Exchange of Views
with British Lawyers JUR/1263/62 at 4 (May 29, 1962).
82. See Legal Service of the European Commission, Second Report on the Exchange of
Views with British Lawyers JUR/1522/62 (June 22, 1962).
83. See First Report on the Exchange of Views with British Lawyers, supra note 81.
84. Id.
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The solution found to the parliamentary sovereignty dilemma in
1962, was according to Norman Marsh a legal fiction to avoid
recognizing a partial surrender of parliamentary sovereignty and let the
post-accession legal system in a state of legal uncertainty:
The difficulty here would be practical. It would place an heavy
burden on judges, they would have to decide how much of our law
was inconsistent with the Treaty and therefore, by implication,
repealed. They would have to interpret a Treaty to which this
country was originally not a party and which was drafted in
languages other than English; […] What is more, the law would
be left for a long time in a great state of uncertainty, and those
unfortunate guinea-pigs, the litigants, would be put to trouble and
expense in order to provide the cases on which the judges could
give their rulings.85

This fictional solution, in support of parliamentary sovereignty
with the exceptional role of Community law, also reappeared in
Wilson’s speech at the House of Common in 1967 explaining that:
[a]ccession to the Treaties would involve passing the United
Kingdom legislation. This would be an exercise of course, of
Parliamentary sovereignty, and it is important to realize that
Community law existing and future, would derive its force as law
in this country form that legislation passed by Parliament. It would
be implicit in our acceptance of the Treaties that the United
Kingdom would, in future refrain from enacting legislation
inconsistent with Community law.86

Even though such legal fiction was central to the UK for the
purpose of the accession, this argument was later used to fuel the
resistance against Brussels. For instance in 1978 in an infringement
procedure initiated by the Commission, Commission v. UK, the new
Labor government in upholding the labor union interests expressly
denounced a transport safety regulation adopted by the prior
government that burdened lorry drivers with unnecessary and
expensive safety features. In this context, labor secretary of Transport
Rodgers openly addressed newspapers explaining that Community
harmonization provisions were not binding on the UK since these were
not laws adopted by parliament.87
85. NORMAN S. MARSH, THE COMMON MARKET AND THE COMMON LAW 455-56 (1962).
86 . See Speech to the House of Commons, Harold Wilson, Prime Minister, United
Kingdom (1967), at 1089.
87. See Commission v. Parliament, C 128/78, Dossier de Procedure (1979).
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The European Court of Justice reiterated that Member States were
prohibited to apply provisions of Community law in an incomplete or
selective manner, effectively annulling the aspects of Community
legislation it opposes or deems contrary to national interests. 88 The
court further noted that even implementation difficulties cannot
preclude Members to opt out of fulfilling its obligation.89 The court
pronounced that a Member States’ failure in the duty of solidarity
undermines Community legal order.90
V. ACT II: IS PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IN DANGER? THE
RESISTANCE TO PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN BRITISH
COURTS
One of the characteristics of the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty as the Hartian rule of recognition of the British judicial
style is that courts are not to go beyond the plain meaning of
Westminster’s statutes. Thus legal change, with some important
exceptions in the common law, albeit limited by precedents, occurs
slowly, and legislative law reforms are the preferred avenues of
reform. 91 In 1962 when the Commission’s legal services began its
meeting with British lawyers they were adamant that a central problem
of the accession was statutory interpretation because:
In their statutory construction English courts avail themselves in
many instances of a literary interpretation, disregarding entirely
the intention of the law-makers as expressed for example by
hearings, various drafts or “Travaux préparatoires”. […]
Following his rule of statutory construction an English judge
might interpret a Treaty provision in an entirely different manner
from his Continental colleagues.92

Despite the predominant use of the plain meaning rule by English
courts, some well-known judges like Lord Denning on the Courts of
Appeal, were in favor of adopting, instead, a purposive interpretation
that was less formalistic and open to the scope and goals of a statute in
question. 93 Even though the Court has done very little use of the
travaux préparatoires and according to a traditional view these have
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Levitsky, supra note 11, at 350.
See First Report, supra note 81, at 3.
See Bridge, supra note 10, at 365.
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played little importance in its interpretation until the mid-1990s, 94
others have pointed at this change in treatment in the use of the
traveaux as among other reasons the prominence of a Scandinavian
legal tradition in Luxembourg. Yet with the increasing use of the
travaux not only by the AGs95 but also by the Court itself in recent
judgments such as Pringle or Gauweiler has to be carefully analyzed
as some scholars have explained “Reference to the drafters’ intent does
not necessarily support dynamic interpretation, and may potentially
even ossify historical interpretations.”96
For instance, Lord Denning explained that when faced with a
legislative gap the judge must:
“set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of
Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the
statute, but also from consideration of the social conditions which
gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy,
and then he must supplement the written word so as to give ‘force
and life’ to the intention of the legislature.”97

The Luxembourg court since the 1960s in some of its iconic cases
such as Van Gend or Costa had relied on a heterodox approach in which
judges used literal and historical interpretations as well as teleological
and comparative interpretations.98 The possible reconciliation between
Luxembourg’s teleological and comparative interpretation of the
Treaty and the UK’s plain meaning approach, was through the use of
the purposive interpretation advocated by Lord Denning. While this
could create a strategic alliance between Lord Denning’s followers and
Luxembourg, by the same token it could also trigger enormous
resistance from the judges bound by textual interpretation of English
law.99

94. See S. Schonberg & K. Frick, Finishing, Refining, Polishing: On the Use of travaux
preparatoires as an Aid to the Interpretation of Community Legislation, 28 EL REV. 149 (2003).
95. See for instance AG Kokott’s opinion in INUIT explaining that the Court shoul make
greater use of the Treaties preparatory works as a supplementary means of interpretation.
96. See SAMULI MIETTINEN & MERITA KETTUNEN TRAVAUX, PREPARATORY WORK AS
A SOURCE OF EU LAW 1-23 (CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES,
SEPTEMBER 2015).
97. See Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. Asher [1949] 2 K.B. 481, 499.
98. Bridge, supra note 10, at 366.
99. Eleonor Sharpston, The shock troops arrive in force: horizontal direct effect of a treaty
provision and temporal limitation of judgments join the armoury of EC law, in THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
ROME TREATY (Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loïc Azoulai eds., 2010) (showing brilliantly the
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Lord Denning had already expressed clearly that the new Treaty,
just like an “incoming tide” would produce a large transformation of
English law that would require new effort from lawyers and judges to
learn from a new system. 100 Lord Denning on the Court of Appeal
managed to convince others about the necessity of a purposive
interpretation to address the new challenge:
What a task is… set before us. The treaty is quite unlike any of the
enactments to which we have become accustomed. The draftsmen
of our statutes have striven to express themselves with the utmost
exactness. They have tried to foresee all possible circumstances
that might arise and provide for them. […] How different is this
Treaty! It lays down general principles. It expresses its aims and
its purposes. All in sentences of moderate length and
commendable style. But it lacks precision.101

Lord Denning brought two interesting battles that show both the
acceptance and the resistance to an openly purposive interpretation of
UK law in light of the provisions of the EEC Treaty.
With respect to the acceptance pattern Lord Denning was adamant
about the fact that UK judges, when interpreting Community law,
should embrace teleological interpretation:
They must divine the spirit of the Treaty and gain inspiration from
it. No longer must they examine the words in meticulous detail. If
they find a gap they must fill it as best they can. They must do
what the framers of the instrument would have done if they had
thought about it. So we must do the same.102

The differences between the members of the Court of Appeal
became clear in Macarthys LtD v. Smith when Lord Denning favored a
teleological approach to article 119 EEC to expand the reach of the
Equal Pay Act of 1970 limiting equal pay to men and women in
contemporaneous employment situations. By moving away from the
plain meaning of the statute, Lord Denning interpreted the broad and
subsequent principle of the Treaty of Rome as stating that equal pay for
men and women should be applied to both contemporaneous and
successive employment. Due to the difference in visions with two other
frustration of some of the UK scholarship with the teleological interpretation of the CJEU).
Thanks to Claire Kilkpatrick for pointing this to me.
100. H. P. Bulmer Ltd v. J. Bollinger S.A. [1974] RPC 96 (10), 418-19.
101. See Bridge, supra note 10, at 370.
102. See H. P. Bulmer Ltd v. J. Bollinger S.A. [1974] RPC 96 (10), 418-19; see also
Bridge, supra note 10, 373.
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members of the Court of Appeal more inclined to follow Lord
Mildew’s dictum forbidding the use of legislative history or “no
English judge looks under the bed,” 103 the case was referred to
Luxembourg.
The European Court of Justice undeniably concurred with Lord
Denning’s interpretation showing that the English textual interpretation
to Community law would run out especially if Luxembourg was the
final arbiter.104 In this sense teleological interpretation also served as
an incentive for progressive lawyering when solicitors and barristers
alike understood that through the preliminary rulings they could win
cases for which English courts were still bound to the plain meaning of
statutes105 and would not likely interpret antidiscrimination directives
by expanding the rights of their plaintiffs.106
With respect to the resistance to Community law, judges had
learned from McCarthy that purposive interpretation found a powerful
ally in Luxembourg and that this was the final arbiter for community
law if the UK court referred the preliminary questions. In a series of
cases in the late 1970s when the Court of Appeal was asked to interpret
norms on the harmonization of trans-continental road transport that
were not Community norms but part of a European Treaty, Lord
Denning together with other four judges argued in favor of a
teleological interpretation. The House of Lords rejected such invitation
due to a lack of authority coming from the parliament. Lord Dilhorne
held “[t]o base our interpretation… on some assumed, and unproved,
interpretation which other courts are to be supposed likely to adopt, is
speculative as well as masochistic.”107
The purposive interpretation of English law in light of the general
principles of Community law had empowered some judges yet it was
clear that for others it provided a dangerous avenue that could put in
danger the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

103. Bridge, supra note 10, at 374.
104. Id. at 375.
105. See Torfaen County Borough Council v. Douglas Willis Limited [2013] UKSC 59
(appeal taken from [2012] EWHC 296).
106. See Miller, supra note 16 at 9.
107. See James Buchanan d Go. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding @ Shipping (U.K.)L td.
119781 1 C.M.L.R. 156, 161 (cited by John Bridge, note 10, at 376).
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VI. ACT III: THE EROSION OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY
THROUGH PRELIMINARY REFERENCES
Another challenge to the UK legal system that the lawyers
addressed in 1962 when discussing with the Commission’s Legal
Services was the challenge of preliminary reference requiring the
uninform interpretation of EU law. 108 Their starting point was that
Community law should be treated merely like an act of Parliament thus
its interpretation required very little assistance from Luxembourg.109
UK lawyers were very anxious to clarify the meaning of a court of last
instance for the purpose of Art 177, 3 ECC (267 TFEU) requiring a
court of last instance to refer a case to Luxembourg. Since an appeal
was exercised as a privilege rather than a right, British lawyers were
puzzled by which court should be considered the Court “against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law.” 110 As the
Commission explained they generally agreed that the Court of Appeal
should be considered such court for the purpose of Art 177 with the
result of empowering such Court to determine the interpretation and
validity of Community acts. 111
A different group of lawyers argued instead that:
Legislation should designate a higher English court to which all
English court, irrespective of their instance, would be obliged to
submit any such preliminary question. This court itself would then
determine which preliminary questions should be submitted to the
Court of Justice.112

Clearly the ability of lower courts to trigger directly and without
centralized supervision the preliminary reference procedure before the
European Court of Justice was something that neither groups even
108. See Second Report on the Exchange of Views with British Lawyers, JUR/1522/62 at
6-8 (June 22, 1962).
109. Bridge, supra note 10, at 372.
110. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
267, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 (The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to
give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and
interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union; Where such a
question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if
it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the
Court to give a ruling thereon; Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court. […]).
111. See Second Report, supra note 101, at 7.
112. Second Report on the Exchange of Views with British Lawyers JUR/1522/62 (June
22, 1962), at 7.
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considered in 1962. These documents highlight the revolutionary role
of the ECJ for the UK judicial hierarchy enabling through the
preliminary reference a direct dialogue between lower courts and
Luxembourg.
The centralizing approach to preliminary references expressed by
UK lawyers was a way to make sure that parliamentary supremacy
would not be challenged by every single judge who could open UK
legislation to the review of the ECJ. Yet the justification to such
centralization was to avoid “frivolous requests,” achieve more uniform
references to facilitate the work of the ECJ, and create a UK court with
greater knowledge and experience about preliminary questions. Such
Court maintaining the monopoly of preliminary references could have
even the power to refer questions ex-officio if the parties didn’t raise
them and if is this was decisive for the resolution of the case at hand.113
The preliminary reference was a sticky issue that even in an
official note by the United Kingdom it was clear that ought to be
resolved in a technical way by lawyers without upsetting the two legal
systems. In Mathew’s report to the parliamentary Assembly he stressed
the need to draft specific legislation by the parliament in conjunction
with judges and practicing barristers and solicitors specifying in detail
“at what point in the proceeding, and on what conditions, and by what
procedure such a reference could be made. Rules would also be
required in this respect for the County Courts.” 114 Even though
politicians made great efforts to ensure that there would be
parliamentary control on the way preliminary questions would go to
Luxembourg, the self-restrain came first of all from the legal culture of
the judiciary that had internalized the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy.
In fact, the resistance of English courts to opening the floodgates
to refer preliminary questions to Luxembourg was well entrenched
until the House of Lords in the 1980s reassured English courts on
seeking and accepting the guidance of the European Court of Justice.115
Almost a decade later, the House of Lords in Factortame116 reassured
British courts about the notion of primacy of Community law and their
113. Id. at 8
114. See Mathew supra note 78, at 5.
115. See D.P.P. v. Henn and Darby [1981] 2 CMLR 229, 233; see also Bridge, supra note
10, at 372.
116. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transp. Ex parte Factortame Ltd (N.2), C-213/89,
1990 1 App. Cas. 602, 659.
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duty to repeal any national legislation that was in direct conflict with a
rule or principle of Community law.
Due to the British legal culture, Article 177:
“served as an effective escape-valve for British courts [and . . . ]
the European Court’s decisions usually leave little discretion to the
courts of the member states. The importance of this outlet is
demonstrated not only by the circumstances under which the
British courts use it but by the difficulties they face when the
European Court’s response is insufficiently precise to provide the
desired clear rule.”117

For instance in Barber118 both the Industrial and the Appeal Tribunals
rejected the claim of Mr. Barber claiming discrimination against its
female counterparts that could receive immediate pensions at a younger
retirement age. When the Court of Appeal finally referred the case to
Luxembourg asking whether pensions could be considered as “pay”
and thus controlled by ART 119 EEC, the ECJ replied in the affirmative
in relying on its famous Defrenne judgment. Yet the ECJ discussed the
temporal effect of the case in order to allow some leeway to national
courts to limit the retroactive effect of this decision due to the huge
financial implications for the British pension system.119
Cases like Barber show how the notion of parliamentary
sovereignty was in fact being eroded as British courts, even lower ones,
were becoming more successful in using preliminary references. In
posing the preliminary questions to Luxembourg “the British judiciary
has been able to avoid what on some occasions would otherwise be an
almost explicit policymaking role. Such a task would have been
impossible to reconcile with their formal tradition.” 120 Yet what
remained challenging for British courts was not so much applying, in
almost a mechanical way, the guidelines provided by Luxembourg, but
rather when the ECJ was not clear and increasingly left hard case or
proportionality analyses to be done by local courts.
The Luxembourg technique to ask national courts to apply the test
elaborated in a very contested issue back home, even though was stroke
117. See Levitsky, supra note 10, at 360.
118. See Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, C-262/88, 1990 E.C.R.
I-1889; see also D. Curtin, Scalping the Community Legislator: Occupational Pensions and
Barber, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 475, 476 (1990).
119. Levitsky, supra note 11 (explaining that the cost of Barber to the pension Industry
for around 76 billion dollars).
120. Id. at 363.
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of genius of ECJ not to meddle with domestic issue, became a huge
problem back home. This was the case of the Sunday trading saga that
began with the Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q plc when two parallel
importers challenged the 1983 Shops Act as a restriction of the free
movement of goods and Article 30 EEC (34 TFEU). After a long and
convoluted judicial battle the only solution came when, on a second
referral from the House of Lords asking a clear question, it obtained a
clear answer from the ECJ that Article 30 EC’s prohibition did not
apply to domestic retailers from allowing them to keep their shops open
on Sundays. 121 Many other countries faced a similar problem in
applying correctly Luxembourg’s rulings, especially when striking a
balance between free movement and social rights protected at the local
level. For instance, the Sunday trading case triggered a decade of
domestic litigation in England. As some have explained this was due,
at the same time, to the manipulation of the preliminary reference by
the Sunday traders as well as the misunderstanding of the ECJ
proportionality test by British administrative judges.122
Preliminary references to Luxembourg liberated UK courts from
the plain meaning of statutory interpretation, allowing UK courts to
become policy innovators vis-à-vis judicial interpretation. 123
Preliminary references allowed lower courts to ask ex-officio a
preliminary question to Luxembourg in the hope of a mechanical
application of the ECJ ruling to the case at hand. This became central
to British lawyers in their advocacy for greater equality in the
interpretation of antidiscrimination provisions. Cases like Colman
show that in broadening the scope of an anti-discrimination directive
by extending it to a woman whose son suffered a disability this proved
to be a successful lawyering strategy driven by a creative solicitor
rather than disabilities rights NGOs.124
Even though the Court of Appeal did not become a centralized
system as the early British politicians were hoping this would become
a gate keeper for preliminary references, the High Court became much
more at ease with a European, purposive and teleological interpretative
121. See Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v B & Q plc, C169/91.
122 . HANS-W. MICKLITZ, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN THE EU:
SUNDAY TRADING, EQUAL TREATMENT AND GOOD FAITH (2005).
123. See Horsley, supra note 15, at 87-88.
124. Coleman v. Attridge Law, C-303/06; see also Miller supra note 16, at 12 (interviews
with Colman’s lawyers).
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style. The approach of the Court of Appeal as highlighted by Levitsky
shows that it “reflects a European-style search for deep underlying
purpose that goes beyond the positivistic language with which these
decisions are framed. The search for legislative purpose is necessarily
a far less determinative endeavor than the traditional British focus on
plain meaning.”125
The common use of purposive interpretation together with an exofficio use of preliminary references by British courts raised among
politicians fears of gouvernement des judges transforming the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty into a legal fiction aiming to hide the
erosion of Westminster’s absolute law making authority.
VII. ACT IV: PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY REINSTATED:
HOW MILLER SAVES THE DAY
On January 24, 2017 the British Supreme Court decided from an
Appeal of the Divisional Court of England and Wales the Miller case
to answer the question posed by the plaintiffs on whether the
Government was able to trigger unilaterally Article 50 of the TEU and
in particular the formal notice of withdrawal from the Union without
the approval of the Parliament.126
The majority opinion is written by eight of the eleven justices of
the Supreme Court, three of which wrote the dissenting opinion. At the
core of the decision there is the question of whether the prerogative to
terminate a Treaty lies with the executive and the Secretary of State
who does not have the power to change UK domestic law that remains
a prerogative of an Act of Parliament.127 In answering this question the
majority reappraised first the relationship between the UK and the EU
from 1971 to 2016, putting emphasis on the 1972 European
Communities Act by Parliament that followed the UK accession to the
EEC in 1973. Without the Parliament’s Act the court holds that in a
dualist system the Accession Treaty would not have been binding in
national law unless it was formally ratified by the legislature.128
The second move of the Court is to reaffirm through the UK
constitutional background the principle of parliamentary sovereignty
125. Levitsky, supra note 11, at 371.
126. Under Article 50 TFEU a member state of the EU can decide to trigger the withdrawal
procedure ‘in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’ before the negotiation and
the rest of the Article’s provisions will take effect.
127. See Miller supra note 16, at ¶ 5.
128. Id. at ¶ 14-17.
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as a limitation on both the Royal Prerogative of the Crown with the
development of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. By the
same token, the majority explains that the independence of the judiciary
is not unbound but constrained in the courts’ discretion and freedom
they enjoy in the common law by parliamentary statutes.129 Here the
majority even mentions Professor Dicey’s statement that “no person or
body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override
or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”130
So here is the hard task for the majority to justify: what happened
during almost forty years of membership when Courts were asked to
set aside UK law in name of the primacy and direct effect of
Community law? But the majority explains:
It is also true that EU law enjoys its automatic and overriding
effect only by virtue of the 1972 Act, and thus only while it
remains in force. That point simply reflects the fact that Parliament
was and remains sovereign: so, no new source of law could come
into existence without Parliamentary sanction - and without being
susceptible to being abrogated by Parliament. However, that in no
way undermines our view that it is unrealistic to deny that, so long
as that Act remains in force, the EU Treaties, EU legislation and
the interpretations placed on these instruments by the Court of
Justice are direct sources of UK law.131

The way through which the majority justifies the survival of
parliamentary supremacy is through a rather traditional dualist
restatement of constitutional law. 132 According to this vision, the
content of rights and duties introduced with the 1972 Act is a matter
for EU law, whereas the constitutional processes by which UK law is
made is a pure matter of domestic law. 133 A final metaphor, the
“conduit pipe,” helps this formalist interpretation presented by the
majority to explain how in forty years politicians and courts could
maintain such dualist vision between EU and domestic law:
In our view, then, although the 1972 Act gives effect to EU law, it
is not itself the originating source of that law. It is, as was said on
behalf of the Secretary of State echoing the illuminating analysis

129. Id. at ¶ 42.
130. Id. at ¶ 43.
131. Id. at ¶ 61.
132. Thomas Poole, Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review, 25(4) OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 697 (2005) (paper by Tom Poole on the divisional court case).
133. See Miller, supra note 16, at 62.
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of Professor Finnis, the “conduit pipe” by which EU law is
introduced into UK domestic law. So long as the 1972 Act remains
in force, its effect is to constitute EU law an independent and
overriding source of domestic law.134

This balanced decision by the Supreme Court reinstates the full
parliamentary supremacy and it is contrasted by Lord Reed’s dissent,
arguing that a mere notification of withdrawal under article 50 TFEU
together with its negotiation falls squarely under the prerogative power
of the Court, advised by its Ministers that was not altered by the 1972
Act.135
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE LUXEMBOURG
JUDICIAL STYLE AFTER BREXIT
After the outcomes of the Brexit referendum, some legal
academics are openly monitoring and exposing the political and
economic changes that leaving the EU entails for UK citizens.136 This
public role for scholars and judges has not spared them from being
called ‘enemies of the people’ or from more violent threats. Michael
Dougan’s new edited volume calls for scholars’ political and
professional responsibility to fully engage with the outcomes of Brexit
because the “UK withdrawal is not just about finding a new relationship
with the EU. It is also about opening our own legal and political
systems to processes of far-reaching change.” 137 The extent of such
change is also the topic at the core of this symposium tackling how UK
law has influenced EU law.138 To better understand the challenges of
“de-Europeanization,”139 my contribution revamps some of the early
history of the UK accession showing that the relation between
continental and common law lawyers was initially tainted by deep
skepticism and later on by mutual-influence as well as resistance to
Europeanization.

134. Id. at ¶ 65.
135. Id. at ¶¶ 159, 177.
136. See The Citizen Brexit Observatory, http://ecas.org/services/citizen-brexitobservatory/.
137. See Michael Dougan, Editor’s Introduction, in THE UK AFTER BREXIT. LEGAL AND
POLICY CHALLENGES 1-12, 5 (Michael Dougan ed. 2017).
138. See Gelter supra p. 1329.
139. Id. p. 1330.
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After a forty years relationship between London and
Luxembourg, it remains unclear how much the inner workings of the
CJEU will change by losing their UK members, including three judges
and one advocate general. Some features of the common law style as
well as the use of English as a lingua franca in oral conversations have
transformed, in an irreversible way, the Luxembourg judicial style. By
the same token, beyond the uncertainties of the Brexit negotiations,
there is no doubt that the Luxembourg jurisprudence will continue to
be closely monitored by UK judges and lawyers as to whether it will
become a foreign law with an indirect impact on their legal system or
it will continue to be cited as a valid precedent in the UK legal system.
Yet those UK judges and lawyers that after the initial “incoming
tide” have internalized a more purposive and teleological style vis à vis
statutory interpretation will be precluded to refer preliminary
references to Luxembourg under TFEU 267.140 As Thomas Horsley has
explained, de-Europeanization will reduce the space created by the
preliminary reference procedure between UK domestic courts and
Luxembourg, thus reducing the activism of lower courts that have been
the engine of policy innovation in areas such as employment
discrimination and equal treatment law. 141 By re-centralizing, under
traditional judicial hierarchies, the role of lower courts it is unlikely
that the Withdrawal Act will undermine the freedoms and equality
guarantees that lawyers and judges alike have achieved through their
legal struggles both at home and in Luxembourg.

140. See Chapter 6 of The European Union Withdrawal Bill of July 13, 2017 on the
Interpretation of retained EU lawhttps://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/20172019/0005/18005.pdf.
141. See Thomas Horsley, Brexit and UK Courts: Awaiting Fresh Instruction in THE UK
AFTER BREXIT. LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES 73-94, 78-79 (Michael Dougan ed. 2017).

